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This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on village governance and local public goods provision. 
Using data from 144 village-level governments in India's Tamil Nadu state, we examine whether the 
gender and caste of village government leaders influence village public goods provision. In particular, we 
examine: 1) whether public goods are provided in accordance with gender or caste preferences; and 2) 
whether public goods provision differs based on the knowledge level of the village government leader. 
We find evidence of different preferences for public goods between men and women, and between 
Scheduled Caste (SC) and non-SC persons. Additionally, a test of knowledge regarding the village 
government reveals that female and SC presidents receive lower scores relative to male and non-SC 
presidents, with women scoring lowest overall. We find that preferences and knowledge have little effect 
on public goods provision by female presidents, and hypothesize that this may be due to the influence of 
their male spouses. In the context of SC presidents, we find evidence that SC presidents provide more 
drinking water access—a location-specific public good—to SC-inhabited village areas.  




1.  INTRODUCTION 
Decentralization of governance has been a common phenomenon in developing countries since the 1990s, 
largely owing to the relative inability of centralized governments to tackle poverty. Some of the many oft-
cited benefits of decentralization compared to more centralized governance are that local governments 
can better serve the needs and identify the preferences of their constituents (Prud'homme, 1995); they can 
better enforce and coordinate policies and programs (Prud'homme, 1995); they may be less corrupt than 
centralized governments (Bardhan, 2002); and they can be more easily monitored by citizens (World 
Bank, 2000).  
However, empowering local government bodies to provide public goods and services can create 
new problems when a population is very heterogeneous. In particular, politicians may favor their home 
areas or ethnic groups—which provide them with votes—with increased expenditures at the expense of 
other minorities. Indeed, capture by the elite or majority is often problematic in a democratic system 
(Bardhan, 2002). In an effort to overcome the capture problem, some countries have adopted reservation 
or affirmative action policies to protect under-represented groups. The large-scale reservation policies 
adopted in India—an extremely diversified country in terms of race, caste, and religion—provide an 
excellent setting for evaluating the impact of reservation policies.  
While India attempted decentralization to the village level several times following the country’s 
independence in 1947, decentralization in India was largely advanced in the early 1990s with the 
enactment of the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments. The 73rd Amendment,
1 which focused on 
decentralization in rural areas, required the creation of three tiers of sub-state governance at the district, 
block (or union), and village levels in each of India's 28 states.
2 These local governments take the name 
panchayat from the village councils that have existed for hundreds of years in some parts of India 
(DHAN, 2006). Panchayat comes from the word ‘panch’ (meaning ‘five’), as the old village governments 
used to have five members, each elected every five years. The five-year terms still hold for modern-day 
panchayats. India presently has about 500 district, 6000 block and 230,000 village panchayats.
3 While the 
creation of three levels of panchayats is compulsory for all states, the states can use their discretion in 
determining the specific duties and funding of the panchayats. 
The 73rd Amendment notably calls for reservation of seats at all levels of the panchayats for 
women and Scheduled Caste
4 persons. Village panchayats, known as gram panchayats (GPs), have 
recently received a great deal of attention in the literature. A minimum of one-third of the GPs presidents' 
seats within a state must be reserved for women, and another portion are reserved for Scheduled Caste 
(SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) persons, based on the composition of SC/ST persons within the state. 
These mandatory reservations
5 are well-suited for empirical analyses of the role of GPs in public goods 
provision, and the extent of influence of the GP president (known in some states as the pradhan). In 
reality, the reservation system is largely followed; Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) cite 100 percent 
compliance with the reservation policy for women in West Bengal and Rajasthan (p. 1414), while we find 
97 percent compliance in our sample of GPs from Tamil Nadu state.
6 
The work of Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) was the first major attempt to empirically analyze 
the effect of women politicians in India. Because women's performance as politicians may be correlated 
                                                      
1 The 74th Amendment applies to municipalities, while the 73rd is for rural areas. 
2
 India's seven Union Territories are headed by a federal government-appointed administrator. 
3 See Mahal et al. (2000) for a detailed description of the functions, duties, et cetera at each level of the panchayats for 
several states. 
4 “Scheduled Caste” refers to persons of a group historically found at the bottom of India's caste system of social hierarchy. 
This group was formerly referred to as the “Untouchables.” 
5 Reservation of seats for women and SC/ST persons is required for all elected positions in the three tiers of the panchayats; 
we herein focus solely on the position of GP president. 
6 However, the assignment of the reservations was not implemented perfectly in Tamil Nadu. We discuss this in more detail 
in Section 2.  
2 
 
with the place where they were elected, it can be difficult to separately assess the effect of women on 
political outcomes. However, when female-reserved seats are randomly assigned,
7 this endogeneity is 
overcome, and differences found in performance between male and female presidents can confidently be 
attributed to gender. Such an analysis is undertaken in Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), and the results 
show significantly different provision of public goods by male and female presidents in the GPs of West 
Bengal and Rajasthan states. Using data on female presidents and public goods provision in GPs, 
combined with data on women's preferences, the authors show that female village leaders invest more in 
public goods considered important by women, such as drinking water and roads in West Bengal GPs, and 
drinking water in Rajasthan GPs. 
However, Ban and Rao (2008) find that female presidents in women-reserved GPs do not perform 
any differently than men. In particular, the authors find that female presidents do not provide public goods 
in line with their preferences, nor do they provide fewer public goods than men. They also find that, in the 
four states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu, the majority of women were not 
persuaded by their husbands to run for the presidential seat in women-reserved GPs. This finding on 
husbands' influence (or lack thereof), however, comes from pooled data on female presidents' across all 
four states, and therefore does not capture possible variation between states. 
The effect of SC reservations on public goods provision in India has been studied at the 
constituency and state levels in Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) and Pande (2003), respectively. 
Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) examine villages’ access to public goods, using data at the constituency 
level in 15 Indian states. They find evidence of convergence in villages' access to public goods; 
constituencies with greater concentrations of SC persons had better village access to public goods in 1991 
compared to 1971. Banerjee and Somanathan credit this improvement to the following: 1) Indian 
government programs aimed at equalizing public goods access; and 2) SC persons becoming politically 
mobilized and active from the 1980s onwards. Pande (2003), using a panel of state-level data from 1960-
1992, finds that SC and ST reservations at the state level increase the transfers to SC and ST persons, in 
the form of increased job quotas and increased welfare spending. 
Besley et al. (2004) examine village-level SC reservations and public goods provision by 
analyzing various aspects of local governance using a World Bank dataset from the four Southern Indian 
states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu. Regarding reservation policies and 
outcomes, the authors show that GPs with SC/ST-reserved presidents have a significantly positive effect 
of on SC/ST households, which are about six percent more likely to receive a local (or ‘household’) 
public good compared to SC/ST households in non-SC/ST-reserved GPs. 
The goal of this paper is to better understand the performance of female and SC presidents, to 
specifically examine the case of Tamil Nadu, and to provide insight into means for improving public 
goods provision in rural India. This issue is important for several reasons. First, 75 percent of India's poor 
reside in rural areas. Second, the empowerment of women in developing countries has come to the 
forefront of development; it is one of the eight Millennium Development Goals, and the World Bank has 
put gender empowerment high on their agenda, stating that gender inequality hinders development and 
poverty reduction (World Bank, 2001). Inasmuch as the empowerment of women embodies their 
inclusion in governance—a statistic that has increased in recent years—it is important to empirically 
study the performance of women in developing country governments. Third, SC persons often come from 
more disadvantaged backgrounds, and have lower incomes, education, and literacy rates. While their 
inclusion in village governance is important, it is still necessary to evaluate their performance while in 
office. 
This paper contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of women and SC persons in India's 
village governments by building upon the previously discussed work
8 in the following four ways. (1) We 
                                                      
7 Random assignment of reservation seats is not as common as implied in the literature, and is not a national or required 
feature of India's reservation policies. Indeed, states are free to decide how to select seats for reservation in the panchayats, and 
many chose to assign reserved seats based on population ratios. 
8 In this paper, we focus on the literature examining decentralized governance in India. Analyses of decentralization and  
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duplicate the analysis of Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) and Ban and Rao (2008) in Tamil Nadu, and 
examine whether the findings are context-specific from state to state. (2) We develop an extremely 
detailed village-level dataset for two time periods, as opposed to the recall data on public goods used by 
both Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) and Ban and Rao (2008). This allows us to perform a more precise 
difference-in-differences analysis. We also use many outcome variables to measure provision of public 
goods by the GP, allowing us to check the robustness of our results. (3) We include the results from a test 
given to GP presidents, providing data on presidents' knowledge of the GP rules and regulations. (4) We 
examine the reservation policies for women and SC presidents in the same setting, even though these are 
often discussed separately in the literature. 
We find that although preferences for public goods differ across gender and caste, female and 
male presidents provide public goods similarly. In other words, female presidents are not providing public 
goods according to their preferences, as suggested by Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004). However, we find 
some support for the notion that SC presidents provide more location-specific public goods—namely, 
access to potable water—relative to non-SC presidents, and favor SC-inhabited areas of villages in this 
provision. 
In the next section, we discuss the history and governmental setting in Tamil Nadu state, and then 
explain our survey in Tamil Nadu. We then describe our empirical strategy for estimating the effect of 
having a reserved seat in a GP. Following that, we analyze the performance of female and SC presidents, 
and estimate the effect of gender and caste on public goods provision in reserved GPs. We finish with 
some concluding thoughts. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
public goods provision have been undertaken in other countries; see, for example, Faguet (2004), West and Wong (1995), Zhang 
et al. (2004), and Zhang and Zhou (2001).  
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2.  THE SETTING 
Located in the southernmost region of India (see Figure 1), Tamil Nadu was originally part of the Madras 
State after India's independence in 1947, and became present-day Tamil Nadu in 1968. Today, Tamil 
Nadu is bordered by Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka to the North, Kerala to the West, and by the coastline 
to the East and South. It is the sixth most populous state in India. The agricultural sector is the main 
source of income, employing 70 percent of the state's population. Tamil Nadu incorporated the 73rd 
Constitutional Amendment into its state constitution in the 1994 Tamil Nadu Panchayat Act. Its first 
panchayat elections were held in 1996, the second in 2001, and the third in 2006.  




Prior to the Tamil Nadu Panchayat Act and the 1996 elections, village governance was very 
different than after 1996. In the 1960s and 1970s, Tamil Nadu had village level panchayats, but the 
presidents were internally selected from among several ward members (individuals who represented  
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different ‘neighborhoods' of the village). From roughly the 1980s through to the enactment of the Tamil 
Nadu Panchayat Act, nearly all activities at the village level were carried out through the block 
development officer (BDO). From the 1996 GP elections onwards, village level governance has consisted 
of the GPs, with direct election of the president by the GP citizens.  
GP reservations in Tamil Nadu hold for 10 years (two election terms), as opposed to the one-term 
reservations used in many other states. The selection of GPs for reservation—for both women and 
SC/ST—is done at the block level. Tamil Nadu does not randomly select GPs in which to reserve seats 
for women and SC/ST persons. For the 1996 elections (the first elections following the Tamil Nadu 
Panchayat Act), one-third of GPs in each block were reserved for women and 20 percent were set aside 
for SC/ST presidents. The reserved GPs are chosen as follows: 
1.  All GPs within a block are arranged in descending order of the ratio of SC persons to the total 
population. The top 20 percent are set aside for SC/ST reservations. 
2.  If the ST population in a block is above a certain level, one GP is reserved for an ST president. If 
not, all 20 percent of SC/ST reservations chosen in part (1) are set for SC reservation.
9 
3.  The GPs in the 20 percent reserved for SC/ST reservations are arranged in descending order of 
the ratio of female SC persons to the total SC population. The top one-third is reserved for female 
SC presidents. 
4.  The remaining GPs are sorted in descending order of the ratio of females to the total population. 
The top one-third is reserved for female presidents.  
5.  All reservations hold for 10 years, or two terms. After 10 years, this same procedure is 
implemented, except that the GPs previously reserved for SC/ST presidents are excluded from 
step (1) and the GPs previously reserved for women are excluded from step (4). 
Given this method for assigning reservations to GPs, a regression discontinuity (RD) approach
10 
would be ideal for identifying the effect of reservations on differences in public goods provision. 
However, we found that the assignment of reservations is performed imperfectly. Reservations are 
implemented at the block level, and the 12 blocks in our sample have, on average, a 27.3 percent error 
rate in women-reserved GPs, and a 39.1 percent error rate in SC-reserved GPs.
11 Given our relatively 
small sample size, combined with errors in reservation assignment, we cannot follow the RD approach. 
Therefore, we use an ordinary least squares estimation procedure—using the difference-in-differences 
method—to identify the effect of reservations on public goods provision. 
Although the assignment of reservations was not a completely random process in 1996 due to the 
ordering of GPs by population ratios, we believe that reservations for women are not related to any 
unobserved determinants of public goods provision. This argument can be made on the following 
grounds: (i) the women-to-total population ratio is extremely similar across GPs in a block, as shown in 
Table 1; (ii) GPs selected for female reservation do not significantly differ from non-reserved GPs in a 
number of other village attributes analyzed herein, as shown in Table 2;
12 and (iii) a t-test of the 
                                                      
9 No GPs in our sample were selected for ST reservation; because the ST population in Tamil Nadu is very small, few (if 
any) GPs in Tamil Nadu are selected for ST reservation overall. 
10 A regression discontinuity (RD) approach involves comparing observations just above and just below the cutoff 
population ratios for reservation. 
11 The error rate is calculated as the percent of reserved GPs that should not have been reserved, based on the population 
ratio threshold rule that should have been followed. We compare village characteristics and public goods characteristics in 1991 
between GPs with and without an error in their reservation status. The results are presented and discussed in the Appendix. 
Overall, we do not find evidence to suggest that errors in the assignment of reservations are correlated with factors that influence 
public goods provision. 
12 One exception is that the number of Christian households is significantly greater in unreserved villages; however, 
Christian households comprise less than two percent of total households in our sample, so we are not concerned with this  
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difference in mean public goods levels in 1991 (before the reservation assignments were made) shows 
that GPs selected for female reservation in 1996 do not significantly differ from unreserved GPs in any of 
the nine public goods measures we use in this analysis.
13  
In the case of SC reservations, however, it is clear that the percentage of the SC population is not 
the same in every GP within a block. Table 1 also shows that the ratio of SC persons to the total 
population in a GP fluctuates widely across GPs, while Table 3 shows that some village attributes vary 
across SC-reserved GPs. 
Despite these shortcomings in the selection of seats for reservation, we first perform an analysis 
without correcting for non-randomness. We then undertake additional analyses to address the non-
randomness, and to test the robustness of our results. 

















Avinashi 12 0.4795  0.0166  0.2558  0.0611 
Gudimangalam 12  0.4966  0.0114  0.2669  0.0644 
Palladam 12 0.4909  0.0131  0.2093  0.0558 
Pollachi (North)  12  0.4876  0.0131  0.2177  0.0919 
Pudukottai 
Aranthangi 12  0.5091  0.0213  0.0979  0.0547 
Karambakudi 12  0.4986  0.0116 0.2855  0.1692 
Kunnandar Koil  12  0.4946  0.0096  0.1731  0.1229 
Ponnamaravathi 12  0.5186  0.016  0.1774  0.1132 
Vellore 
K.V.Kuppam 12  0.4943  0.0149 0.2866  0.1765 
Kanniyambadi 12  0.5051  0.0113  0.2421  0.1111 
Natrampalli 12  0.4915  0.0095  0.2235  0.1761 
Nemeli 12  0.4963 0.0122  0.2897  0.1735 
                                                                                                                                                                           
difference. 
13 This is shown later in the paper, in Table 8.  
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Table 2. Differences between GPs unreserved and reserved for female presidents (Year=1991) 
Variable  Mean, Unreserved GP  Mean, Reserved GP  Difference 
Village population –total  2584.24  2699.36  -115.12 
      0.68 
Village under six years of age  318.21  312.97  5.24 
      0.89 
Ratio of females to total population  0.495  0.503  -0.008** 
      0.017 
Backward Caste (BC) population  715.62  1012.21  -296.59 
      0.25 
Scheduled Caste (SC) population  550.62  604.79  -54.17 
      0.49 
Households total  576.69  636.73  -60.03 
      0.37 
Hindu households  545.59  615.67  -70.08 
      0.29 
Muslim households  19.53  15.27  4.26 
      0.38 
Christian households  11.58  5.79  5.79* 
      0.06 
Farm households  319.14  346.58  -27.44 
      0.51 
Village citizens working in village  561.45  548.58  12.87 
      0.88 
Female village citizens working in village  60.5  60.91  -0.41 
      0.97 
Total cultivated land (acres)  2173.92  2353.22  -179.3 
      0.59 
Literates 1171.82  1335.3  -163.48 
      0.27 
Notes: - P-values are given in italics. 
- Indicates significance at *10%, **5%, ***1%. 




Table 3. Differences between GPs unreserved and reserved for SC presidents (Year=1991) 
Variable  Mean, Unreserved GP  Mean, Reserved GP  Difference 
Village population - total  2699.19  2189.04  510.15* 
      0.1 
Village population - under six years of 
age 
327.01 269.4  57.61 
      0.18 
Ratio of females to total population  0.496  0.499  -0.003 
      0.46 
Backward Caste (BC) population  804.43  684.4  120.03 
      0.67 
Scheduled Caste (SC) population  524.01  748.8  -224.79*** 
      0.01 
Households total  606.27  515.16  91.11 
      0.22 
Hindu households  577.03  488.44  88.59 
      0.22 
Muslim households  18.99  16.48  2.51 
      0.64 
Christian households  10.25  10.24  0.01 
      0.99 
Farm households  334.01  284.56  49.45 
      0.28 
Village citizens working in village  563.26  535.84  27.42 
      0.77 
Female village citizens working in village  60.89  59.16  1.73 
      0.88 
Total cultivated land (acres)  2279.85  1906.36  373.49 
      0.31 
Literates 1237.06  1077.08  159.98 
      0.33 
Notes: - P-values are given in italics. 




3.  THE DATA 
The data for this study come from village-level surveys implemented through a joint research project of 
the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and Tamil Nadu Agricultural University 
(TNAU). Based on the human development index for each district, the districts of Tamil Nadu were 
divided into three categories: Developed, Moderately Developed, and Less Developed. For the survey, 
one district was randomly selected from each of the three categories listed above, from which four Block 
Panchayats (BPs) were randomly chosen. From each of the 12 BPs, 12 GPs were randomly selected, 
making a total of 12 BPs and 144 GPs from the three districts. The survey involved five different 
interview schedules, as outlined in Table 4. The three districts from which the 144 GPs for this survey 
were selected—Coimbatore, Pudukottai, and Vellore—are highlighted in Figure 2. 





Profile characteristics of village  
Panchayat President/Ward Councilor  
and activities of the Panchayat 
1) GP president 
2) 1 ward member 
1) 48 
2) 48 
Voter’s interview   10 randomly selected voters per village; 
6 from main village (3 men, 3 women),  
4 from hamlets (2 men, 2 women)  
90 
Focus group discussion  4 randomly selected citizens per village   36 
Interaction schedule*   1) DP and state government 
2) BP, local bodies and administration 
3) GP and BP 
4) local bodies and administration 
3 (1 per block) 
Secondary data schedule  An extensive compilation of village,  
citizen, and panchayat council  
characteristics 
48 (1 per village) 
Notes: * Bold indicates the interviewee. 
 The interviewee was surveyed about his/her relationship(s) with the other body(ies) listed. 
  DP refers to the District Panchayat, BP refers to the Block (or Union) Panchayat, and GP is the Gram Panchayat.  
10 
 




4.  THE EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
This study aims to examine the treatment effect of reserving the GP president’s position for women and 
SC persons. The impact of a reservation is given by estimating θ, where 
  yi = α + Xiβ + θDi + εi ,   (1) 
y is a measure of public goods at the GP level, and D is a dummy variable for reservation that takes on a 
value of 0 for unreserved GPs and 1 for reserved GPs. Then, 
  E[θ] = E[yi|Xi , Di = 1] - E[yi|Xi , Di = 0],    (2) 
where θ̂ is the least-squares estimate of θ and the conditioning variables, Xi, control for those things 
correlated with Di that could affect yi. However, unobservable factors that affect the receipt of treatment 
are present in the error term and may lead to biased estimates of θ. Such unobservables include caste or 
gender biases among citizens in certain villages. For example, a GP with a higher female population ratio 
may be more pro-female, meaning that a female president could have more influence in this GP compared 
to a GP with a lower female population ratio. 
Our task is to estimate the effect of reservation by comparing reserved and unreserved GPs. 
However, because we can never observe a reserved GP in the absence of a reservation,
14 estimates of the 
effect of reservation can be biased, as described above. One technique to control for potential bias caused 
by unobservable factors is a difference-in-differences (DID) estimation strategy.
15 
Difference-in-Differences Estimation 
DID estimation uses a control group and an experimental group, and observations in at least two time 
periods: one before the ‘change’ and one after. The benefit of using the DID approach is that, even if 
there are unobservable factors that influenced a GP's reservation status and could affect public goods 
provision, our estimate of the effect of reservation on public goods provision will be unbiased if those 
factors do not change over time. 
In its most general form, the DID estimator compares the change over time between the two 
groups. In our setting, consider the unreserved (U) and reserved (R) GPs, and the time periods 1991 
(before the local governance and reservation policies were put in place in Tamil Nadu) and 2005 (the 
fourth year of the second term in office, or the ninth year of the 10-year reservations).
16 In this case, the 
DID estimator is given by: 
 
DID = (yR,2005 - yR,1991) - (yU,2005 - yU,1991),
 (3) 
where y is the dependent variable of interest, group R contains the reserved GPs, group U contains the 
unreserved GPs, and y̅g,t is the mean value of y for group g and time t. Note that the DID estimator can 
also be obtained from a regression of the form 
  y = α + β1RESERVED + β22005 + β3(RESERVED · 2005) + ε,   (4) 
                                                      
14 The inability to ever observe the counterfactual is known as the fundamental problem of causal inference. 
15 For the case of analyzing SC-reserved GPs, we also use a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) estimation to test the 
robustness of our results. This work and the associated results are presented in the Appendix. 
16 Note: The data on public toilets, household toilets, and buses and minibuses are from 1995 and 2004. Since 1996 was the 
first year of reservation, these years are suitable for the analysis, as they provide data from before reservation and from the eighth 
year of the reservation.  
12 
 
where RESERVED is a dummy variable equaling one for reserved GPs and 2005 is a dummy 
variable equaling 1 for observations occurring in 2005. β3 is the DID estimator. 
Because of the way in which GPs were selected for reservation, we additionally perform a DID 
estimation while controlling for covariates. The DID estimate is then given by β3 of the following 
regression: 
  y = α + β1RESERVED + β22005 + β3(RESERVED · 2005) + β4X + ε,   (5) 
where X is a vector of covariates, including the GP's female and SC population ratios in 1991, i.e. the 
values on which the reservations are based. Controlling for these variables allows us to further refine our 
estimate of the treatment effect. In particular, the assumption required for an unbiased DID estimate is 
that any unobservable factors that influence whether a GP received treatment and affect the GP's public 
goods outcomes change the same in both treated and untreated villages. This is a much weaker 
assumption than random assignment of reservations. The further refinement of adding covariates to the 
DID estimation means that our DID estimate will still be accurate if, for example, there are differences in 
GPs with different population ratios (which in turn influence a GP's reservation status) and these 
differences change at different rates compared to unreserved villages.  
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5.  THE ANALYSIS 
Panchayat Reservation for Women 
Of the 144 villages in our survey, 33 have GPs with presidential seats reserved for women. Only one 
failed to comply with the reservation policy by seating a male president. The women are on average 43 
years of age (ranging from 29 to 58), and 61 percent of them cite farming as their primary occupation. 
Forty-two percent of the women cite the reservation of the presidential seat as their primary motivation 
for running for office, one-third cite past work with the community as their motivation, and 24 percent 
cite “other” reasons. 
The literacy rate for women in Tamil Nadu is very high at 64.4 percent, compared to the all-India 
female literacy rate of 53.7 percent. The education level of the female presidents in our sample is very 
comparable to that of male presidents: 63.6 and 66 percent of male and female presidents, respectively, 
have at least a high school education. However, on a test of GP knowledge, female presidents scored very 
low. As shown in Table 5, only 36 percent of female presidents in women-reserved GPs answered at least 
half of the test questions correctly, compared to 83 percent of the male presidents. Given such poor 
knowledge of the GP, one might initially expect the performance of female presidents in women-reserved 
GPs to suffer. 
Table 5. Results of 17-question GP knowledge test 
   8 or fewer questions correct  9 or more questions correct 
Male Presidents  17.00%  83.00% 
Female Presidents  63.60%  36.40% 
Non-SC Presidents  28.70%  71.30% 
SC Presidents  41.38%  58.62% 
In this first part of our analysis, we focus on the GP president and the role of gender in public 
goods provision, checking to see (i) if men and women in Tamil Nadu have different preferences for 
public goods, and (ii) if female and male presidents differ in their provision of public goods. 
Preferences 
We start by estimating male and female preferences for public goods. We then compare the means of 
different measures of public goods provision in reserved and non-reserved villages, to examine whether 
female presidents provide public goods according to their preferences. 
We examine citizens' preferences using direct questions from a survey posed to 270 citizens 
randomly sampled in 27 villages over the three districts surveyed in Tamil Nadu. One question 
specifically asked citizens to list up to five infrastructure items needed in their village. All persons of a 
given GP were surveyed from the same village, so no bias resulted from different provisions in different 
villages of the GP. Table 6 lists the percentage of people who gave the noted answer within their top three 
responses.
17 More than 30 different responses were given by the group of 270 citizens; we report the top 
10 responses that were jointly mentioned by the largest percentage of people. 
From Table 6, we see that women cite a need for drainage and buses significantly more than men, 
and cite drinking water more often then men, though not significant at a 10 percent level of significance. 
                                                      
17 Because many people gave the response “No Comment” for their fourth and/or fifth responses, we use only the first three 
responses given by citizens for estimating their preferences for public goods, with the idea that the first three items given by 
respondents are likely to be the ones they consider most important.  
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Men, on the other hand, cite the need for roads and school/education significantly more often than 
women. 
Table 6. Preferences for Infrastructure, by gender (percent of group with response in top 3) 
Response  Mean, Men  Mean, Women  Difference* 
Drinking water  0.4676  0.5573  -0.0896 
      0.142 
Health/Hospital 0.4173  0.4504  -0.0331 
      0.585 
Roads 0.3813  0.2672  0.1141** 
      0.046 
School/Education 0.2950  0.2061  0.0889* 
      0.093 
Sanitation 0.2374  0.1756  0.0618 
      0.212 
Drainage 0.1871  0.2824  -0.0954* 
      0.0644 
Buses 0.1295  0.2214  -0.0919** 
      0.0468 
Group houses  0.1007  0.1221  -0.0214 
      0.577 
Individual pipeline or toilet connection  0.0719  0.0992  -0.0273 
      0.424 
Streetlights 0.0935  0.0763  0.0172 
      0.615 
- P-values are given in italics. 
- Significant at ***1%, **5%, and *10%. 
Provision 
To test whether these differences in preferences for types of public goods are reflected in the provision of 
public goods by male and female presidents, we next compare the difference in public goods outcomes 
across unreserved and reserved GPs. The comparison is straightforward; we use a DID estimation 
procedure to compare means across the two groups from the two time periods. 
We have data on many measures of public goods provision in the GPs, but we restrict this 
analysis to measures of public goods that coincide with the citizens' noted preferences for infrastructure, 
as described in the previous section. Table 7 presents the public goods measure(s) we use for each 
preference revealed in Table 6.
18 Note that these variables reflect changes in infrastructure during a 
president's time in office, as well as changes in outcomes. For example, we use data on the number of 
schools to measure investment in schools and education, while we use data on the number of children 
given various immunizations as an outcome measure of investment in health. These measures are used in 
a DID estimation strategy, with the DID estimation results given in Table 8. 
                                                      
18 Variables for drainage and group housing are not used in the analysis even though they appear in the top 10 of listed 
infrastructure needs; this is because we do not have complete data on these variables for the 144 GPs covered in our sample.  
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Table 7. Public goods measures used in analysis 
Response from Preferences  Public Goods Measures 
Drinking water  Number of borewells; distance to nearest borewell 
Health/Hospital  Composite measure
a of the percentage of children given any 
immunizations of: DPT, BCG, MMR, OPV, Measles, Tetanus-Toxoid  
Roads  Distance to nearest concrete road (in kilometers) 
School/Education  Total number of schools in the village 
Sanitation  Number of public toilets 
Buses  Number of bus and minibus trips 
Individual pipeline/ Toilet connection  Composite measure
a of the number of households with a drinking water 
connection and the number of households with a toilet 
Streetlights  Composite measure
a of the number of streetlights in village and the 
number of operational streetlights in village 
a The ‘composite measure’ is a weighted average of all of the factors listed in each group. The weighted values are calculated 
using a simple factor analysis procedure. 
Table 8. DID estimation without controls for GPs reserved and unreserved for female presidents 
   (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
   Reserved for Women  Unreserved GPs  Time Period Difference  DID 
Estimator     Mean 1991  Mean 2005 Mean 1991  Mean 2005 Reserved  Unreserved 
Number  of  borewells  3.16 5.78  2.97 5.93  2.63  2.96  -0.34 
(3.35) (4.95)  (2.94) (5.79)  [0.42]  [0.35]  [0.70] 
Distance to nearest 
borewell 
0.26 0.23  0.22 0.22  -0.03  0.00  -0.03 
(0.22) (0.22)  (0.22) (0.27)  [0.02]  [0.02]  [0.03] 
HEALTH -  
Composite measure 
a 
-0.13 0.25 -0.20 0.16 0.38 0.37  0.01 
(0.94) (1.07)  (0.74) (1.16)  [0.09]  [0.06]  [0.13] 
Distance to nearest 
concrete road 
a 
0.31 0.17  0.40 0.24  -0.14  -0.16  0.02 
(0.27) (0.27)  (0.36) (0.30)  [0.03]  [0.03]  [0.05] 
Number  of  schools  2.41 2.81  2.51 3.46  0.41  0.94  -0.53* 
(1.27) (1.35)  (1.54) (2.30)  [0.13]  [0.14]  [0.28] 
Number of public 
toilets 
0.28 1.65  0.53 2.40  1.35  1.88  -0.52 
(0.46) (1.74)  (1.03) (5.34)  [0.32]  [0.43]  [0.84] 
Number of bus and 
minibus trips 
8.59 13.28  8.26 13.21  4.69  4.95  -0.26 
(8.05) (13.72)  (9.91) (14.62)  [1.14]  [0.69]  [1.42] 
Household pipeline or 
toilet connection 
-0.28 0.12 -0.28 0.33 0.40 0.61  -0.21 
(0.17) (0.39)  (0.15) (1.02)  [0.06]  [0.10]  [0.18] 
STREETLIGHTS - 
Composite measure 
-0.39 0.14 -0.32 0.39 0.53 0.72  -0.19 
(0.80) (0.88)  (0.71) (1.15)  [0.06]  [0.06]  [0.12] 
Notes: Standard Deviations are given in (parentheses). 
Standard Errors are given in [brackets]. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
Public goods measures are taken at the GP level; the number of observations per time period is 144 unless otherwise noted. 
a These measures included 143 GPs due to missing data in one GP. 
A t-test of the difference in 1991 means between reserved and unreserved villages shows no statistically significant difference for 




Despite gender-specific differences in preference for public goods, we do not find a significant difference 
in the provision of public goods by male and reserved-female GP presidents. Overall, the basic DID 
estimation shows that women in reserved GPs perform very similarly to men, and we do not see strong 
evidence of women providing public goods in accordance with their preferences. Even more interestingly, 
women do not provide fewer public goods than their male counterparts, despite their apparently poorer 
knowledge of the GP. One exception is in provision of schools, where we see significantly lower 
provision in women-reserved GPs. This, however, is consistent with the observation that women have a 
lower preference for schools compared to men. 
These results are robust to controlling for other factors. Table 9 shows the results of a DID 
estimation with covariates added; these are the results of a regression of the form  
  y = α + β1RESERVED + β22005 + β3(RESERVED · 2005) + β4X + ε,   (6) 
where X is a vector of covariates containing the following: GP female and SC population ratios in 1991, 
GP total population in 1991, GP total population of children six years or younger in 1991, a dummy 
variable indicating the president’s membership in the AIADMK political party
19 in 2005, the number of 
villages that comprise the GP, total cultivated land area of the GP in 1991, and block-level control 
variables that allow for different trends in the 12 blocks in our sample. 
The results—in terms of the treatment effect of having a woman president in a reserved seat—are 
largely unchanged. Table 9 shows that the additional covariates do not change the fact that public goods 
provision in GPs is largely consistent between male and female presidents.
20 One significant difference 
does emerge, namely that household water and toilet connections are fewer in women-reserved GPs. 
However, this is only one of the nine outcome measures examined, and household toilet and water 
connections are a relatively low-ranked priority among both men and women. Thus, the main observation 
still holds, i.e. that public goods provision is generally consistent between the male and female presidents. 
Furthermore, we find that (i) membership in the AIADMK political party and (ii) a greater 
number of villages comprising the GP are both correlated with higher public goods provision. Affiliation 
with AIADMK is associated with higher provision of health (proxied by data on children's 
immunizations), bus and minibus trips, and streetlight provision and maintenance. 
This is not surprising, considering that a president who has a good relationship with higher-level 
officials can often steer funds and projects towards his or her GP. We also see that for five of the nine 
measures of public goods (borewells, health, schools, household water/pipeline connections, streetlight 
provision and maintenance) a larger number of villages in the GP is associated with greater provision. 
Note that the neither the number of villages in the GP nor membership in the AIADMK differs 




                                                      
19 The party in power at the state level in Tamil Nadu generally alternates between the DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) 
and the AIADMK (All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) parties. In 2005, the AIADMK was in power from the 2001 
elections. Note that, at the GP-level elections, the de jure rules state that candidates are prohibited from running on a political 
party. However, de facto their party affiliation does indeed play a role. 
20 Other model specifications using covariates in the DID estimation are given in Appendix Tables A1-A3. The results do 
not change overall. 
21 Fifty-nine and 65 percent of male and reserved-female presidents, respectively, belonged to the AIADMK party in 2005; a 
t-test of whether this difference is significantly different from zero yields a p-value of 0.58. In terms of the number of villages in 
a given GP, women-reserved GPs comprise 6.1 villages on average, versus 6.4 for unreserved GPs (p = 0.69).  
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Table 9. DID estimation with controls for GPs reserved and unreserved for female presidents 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 







Distance (km)  
to nearest  
concrete road 











-0.636 -0.0724  0.0229  0.0503  -0.489 -0.529  -1.275  -0.307**  -0.265 
(1.19) (0.058)  (0.25)  (0.090)  (0.46)  (1.01)  (3.44)  (0.15)  (0.24) 
Woman Reservation  -0.0333  0.0238  0.0888  -0.0866 -0.219 -0.236  0.225  0.000847  -0.0607 
(0.82) (0.040)  (0.17)  (0.063)  (0.32)  (0.69)  (2.38)  (0.10)  (0.17) 
2005 -17.83  -0.501  8.608***  0.880  -12.07**  8.696  -60.05  -2.371  -5.056* 
(14.6) (0.72)  (3.07)  (1.13)  (5.69)  (12.4)  (42.5)  (1.79)  (2.99) 
1991 Female 
Population Ratio 
15.69 1.538  0.661  -0.745  0.875  -5.382  58.21  4.062  2.357 
(24.6) (1.20)  (5.17)  (1.89)  (9.58)  (20.8)  (71.4)  (3.01)  (5.02) 
1991 SC Population 
Ratio 
-0.172 -0.0846  -0.140  0.177  1.301  -2.010  -7.756  0.0293 0.304 
(2.82) (0.14)  (0.59)  (0.22)  (1.10)  (2.38)  (8.18)  (0.34)  (0.58) 
# Villages in GP  0.167**  -0.0000991  0.0398**  0.0000940  0.165***  0.0353  0.163  0.0830***  0.0892*** 
(0.082) (0.0040)  (0.017)  (0.0063)  (0.032) (0.070)  (0.24)  (0.010)  (0.017) 
AIADMK Party  -0.0753  0.0272  0.425***  -0.0467  -0.0653  -0.560  3.718*  0.0776  0.378** 
(0.76) (0.037)  (0.16)  (0.058)  (0.29)  (0.65)  (2.19)  (0.092)  (0.15) 
LN 1991 GP 
Population 
1.977 0.0176  -1.129***  -0.103  1.376**  -0.982  1.202  0.185  0.536* 
(1.51) (0.074)  (0.32)  (0.12)  (0.59)  (1.29)  (4.39)  (0.18)  (0.31) 
LN 1991 GP 
Population < 6 
-1.056 -0.00314  0.122  0.0478  0.232  2.100*  2.796  -0.0175 0.0733 
(1.38) (0.067)  (0.29)  (0.10)  (0.53)  (1.17)  (3.99)  (0.17)  (0.28) 
LN Total Cultivated 
Land 1991 
0.700 -0.0127  -0.108  -0.0407  -0.0870 -0.941*  2.014  -0.0302  -0.0610 
(0.60) (0.030)  (0.13)  (0.046)  (0.23)  (0.51)  (1.75)  (0.074)  (0.12) 
Vellore District  -1.759  -0.316***  0.306  0.281*** 0.0195  -2.298**  -9.388***  -0.936***  -0.685*** 
(1.14) (0.056)  (0.24)  (0.087)  (0.44)  (0.96)  (3.30)  (0.14)  (0.23) 
Pudukottai District  -5.602***  -0.509***  -0.960*** 0.137  0.0211  0.0487  -5.547*  -1.164***  -0.334 
(1.10) (0.054)  (0.23)  (0.085)  (0.43)  (0.94)  (3.20)  (0.13)  (0.23) 
Constant 2.969***  0.225***  -0.202**  0.401***  2.509***  0.527  8.259***  -0.283***  -0.322*** 
(0.38) (0.019)  (0.081)  (0.029)  (0.15)  (0.32)  (1.11)  (0.047)  (0.078) 
Observations 286  286  282  283  285  285  286  286  286 
R-squared 0.29  0.35  0.31  0.17  0.32  0.12  0.15  0.54  0.34 
Notes: Observations are at the GP level in 1991 and 2005. 
Time-invariant variables are interacted with year to capture effects due to reservation selection based on 1991 population data. 




Thus far, we have brought together some very interesting phenomena, as follows: 
1.  Women and men in Tamil Nadu's villages have different preferences for public goods.  
2.  Female presidents under-perform relative to their male counterparts on a test of GP knowledge. 
When comparing women and SC persons, female presidents also performed worse than SC 
presidents. 
3.  Female presidents in reserved GPs generally provide the same amount of public goods as men. 
They do not generally provide public goods in accordance with the preference of women in the 
villages of Tamil Nadu. This is consistent with the findings of Ban and Rao (2008) but contrary to 
the findings of Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004). 
As Tamil Nadu is a leader in India in terms of women's empowerment, we might expect that, in 
light of the findings of Chattopadhyay and Duflo, female presidents in the reserved GPs of Tamil Nadu 
would provide more female-preferred goods. Alternatively, we might expect women to provide fewer 
public goods compared to men, due to their apparent lack of knowledge regarding the GP. However, we 
do not find either to be true. Instead, we find that women in reserved GPs perform very similarly to men, 
in terms of public goods provision. 
We explain the similar performance of women and men in Tamil Nadu's GPs using the 
observations of: (i) women's very low scores on the knowledge test, and (ii) the fact that 80 percent of the 
women in our sample told the survey interviewers that they were being influenced by their husbands 
while in office.  
If the knowledge test is an accurate measure of a president’s ability, then the test results indicate 
that women are of lower ability, and we would expect to see lower public goods provision in female-
reserved GPs. However, using an argument similar to that of Basu and Foster (1998),
22 we hypothesize 
that women in reserved GPs acquire ability from their husbands. Given women's low scores on the GP 
knowledge test, they may turn to the men in their households for help while in office. This acquisition of 
knowledge and assistance (for example, help with filling out paperwork or applying for funding through 
one of the many government public goods schemes) may allow the men to influence the women in favor 
of more male-preferred public goods.  This could explain the similar performances of male and female 
presidents; the women are not providing fewer public goods (as might be suggested by the lower test 
scores) because they are being helped by men. At the same time, they are not providing public goods in 
accordance with their preferences (as suggested by the findings of Chattopadhyay and Duflo) because 
they are being influenced by the men's preferences. Alternatively (or in addition), it is possible that male 
and female presidents simply provide to the average preference in Tamil Nadu's villages, in which case 
we would not see very different provision between the sexes. However, even if this is the case, we would 
still expect to see lower provision in women-reserved GPs, given the lower test scores of female 
presidents and our supposition that the test reflects ability. 
It is also possible that the test score is not a good measure of ability, and good test performance is 
not required for a president to be capable of providing public goods. However, we argue that the lower 
test scores are still indicative of something. The knowledge test, consisting of basic questions about the 
GP, was given to presidents in the fourth year of their presidencies. If a sitting president is truly active in 
the position, he/she should be able to answer more than half of the questions correctly. The very poor 
results of female presidents on this test at the very least indicate a lack of interest and/or activity while in 
                                                      
22 Basu and Foster (1998) claim that the ‘proximate literacy’ rate of a country is a more important measure of literary than 
the actual literacy rate. They conclude that an illiterate person living in a household with a literate person is much better off than 
an illiterate person with no literates in the household.  This is due to the positive externality of having at least one literate person 
around, capable of reading and providing information to the illiterate person. Such a person is called a ‘proximate literate,’ as 
compared to an ‘isolated illiterate.’  
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office. Therefore, if a low test score indicates a lack of participation in GP activities by the president, we 
would again expect to see lower public goods provision by presidents with lower test scores (i.e., women 
in reserved GPs), and we do not observe this.  Therefore, this again supports our hypothesis that the 
reserved-women presidents were helped or influences by men, resulting in similar levels of public goods 
provision.  
Furthermore, Table 10 shows that reserved-female presidents have significantly less contact with 
higher-level officials. In order to get funds or projects for a GP, the president must be in contact with 
higher-level officials in order to apply for funds through government schemes administered at the Block 
or District levels. Indeed, our field researchers reported anecdotal evidence suggesting that it is very 
important for a president to have a good relationship with these officials. The significantly lower contact 
between reserved-female presidents and higher-level officials provides further support for the notion that 
men may very well be involved in women's presidencies. This would seem to explain how women and 
men perform similarly while in office, even though the women have much less contact with officials. 
Table 10. Reserved-female presidents’ contact with higher-level panchayat officials 
  Contact with the  Contact with the  Contact with the 
  Block Development Officer  Panchayat Union Chairman  District Panchayat Chairman 
Woman 
Reservation 
-0.225** -0.380***     -0.344*** -0.527***    -0.122*  -0.188***   
(0.10)  (0.09)   (0.12)  (0.09)   (0.07)  (0.06)  
Test score  0.047***    0.060***  .084***     0.099***  0.036***     0.043*** 
(0.01)   (0.01)  (0.02)   (0.02)  (0.01)   (0.01) 
Constant -1.257  1.721***  -2.319*** -3.445*** 1.653***  -4.693*** -3.760*** -1.099*** -4.294*** 
(0.89)  (0.26) (0.78) (1.06) (0.26) (1.00) (1.04) (0.22) (0.97) 
Observations  144  144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 
Notes: Observations are at the GP level in 2005. 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The values listed for the "Women Reservation" and "Test Score" variables are the marginal effects estimated using the 
coefficients obtained from fitting a logistic regression to the data, which give the change in the probability of having high contact 
with the official as the independent variable changes. 
"Contact with the…" refers to the frequency of contact between the GP president and the listed official. In the case of the Block 
Development Officer, the dependent variable for contact equals 0 (low contact) if the president answered that contact happened 
"never," "rarely," or "sometimes," and equals 1 (high contact) if the president answered "frequently." In the case of the Panchayat 
Union Chairman and the District Panchayat Chairman, the dependent variable for contact equals 0 (low contact) if the president 
answered "never" or "rarely," and equals 1 (high contact) if the president answered "sometimes" or "frequently." 
Ban and Rao (2008) find that only 20 percent of reserved-women GP presidents indicate that they 
ran for office because of their spouses. Based on this, the authors conclude that women are not serving as 
tokens for their husbands. This is a problematic conclusion for two reasons. First, there is surely some 
error in a woman’s self-reporting of whether her spouse urged her to run for office. Second, this question 
captures only the effect of a spouse urging a woman to run for office, yet this is only one of many ways a 
president may be influenced by a spouse. Even if a woman runs for office due to her own motivation, her 
spouse will have other opportunities to influence or at least participate in her presidency. Third, and 
perhaps most importantly, the responses are aggregated across four states in Ban and Rao, meaning that 
state-specific differences in spousal influence are not captured. State-specific studies are important in 
contexts such as these, because they allow us to better understand and appreciate the different cultural 
settings and experiences of states, especially in a country as diverse as India.   
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The fact that female presidents are not providing fewer public goods while in office would seem 
to support India's reservation policies, which encourage the active participation of women in governance. 
Our results, however, do suggest some policy changes. In particular, this analysis shows that although 
women and men provide similar levels of public goods while in office, women score far lower on GP 
knowledge. Increased or more targeted training for female presidents may help them improve their 
performance of official duties. Indeed, many of the female presidents interviewed for this study 
complained that training was given either too late or not at all, and that they were given an 
overwhelmingly large amount of paperwork to read and understand. This seems to suggest that more 
timely and adequate training for female presidents may further support their role in Indian governance. 
Panchayat Reservation for the Scheduled Caste 
Next, we analyze Scheduled Caste presidents in Tamil Nadu and their public goods provision. SC persons 
comprise approximately 19 percent of Tamil Nadu's population; this is reflected in the 20 percent of GP 
presidential seats that are reserved for SC persons. In our data set, 25 GPs are reserved for SC-persons, 
two of which failed to comply with the reservation, for a total of 23 GPs reserved for SC persons. The SC 
presidents are 44 years of age on average (ranging from 35 to 60), and 64 percent cite farming as their 
primary occupation. Forty-four percent of the SC presidents in SC-reserved GPs state that previous 
community work motivated them to run for office, two percent cite the reservation as their motivation, 
and 24 percent say that they ran for “other” reasons. 
SC persons in Tamil Nadu have a literacy rate of 63.2 percent, lower than the 75.9 percent rate 
among non-SC persons in Tamil Nadu. Additionally, they have lower educational levels than their non-
SC president counterparts; only 48 percent of the SC presidents in our sample had education through high 
school or beyond, compared to 69 percent of non-SC persons. Thus, it is not surprising that the GP 
knowledge of SC presidents is lower than that of non-SC presidents, as reflected in their scores on the GP 
knowledge test. Notably, however, the SC presidents score higher on the test than women presidents in 
reserved GPs (Table 5). 
In this next part of our analysis, we focus on the GP president and the role of caste on public 
goods provision. More specifically, we examine: (i) if SC and non-SC presidents have different 
preferences for public goods, and (ii) if SC presidents have different provision of public goods compared 
to non-SC presidents. 
Preferences 
Using the same data as in the gender comparison described above, we estimate SC and non-SC 
preferences for public goods. We then compare the means of different measures of public goods provision 
in reserved and non-reserved villages. Comparable to Table 6 for the case of males versus females, Table 
11 lists the percentage of SC and non-SC individuals giving the listed answer for at least one of their top 
three responses. 
From Table 11, we see that SC persons cite the need for health care/hospitals and group housing 
significantly more often than non-SC persons, and a greater need for drinking water, though this is not 
significant at 10 percent. Non-SC persons, on the other hand, cite a need for school/education and 




Table 11. Preferences for infrastructure, by caste (percent of group with response in top 3) 
Response  Mean, non-SC  Mean, SC  Difference 
Drinking water  0.4603 0.5556 -0.0952 
      0.119 
Health/Hospital 0.3730  0.4861  -0.1131* 
      0.0617 
Roads 0.3413  0.3125  0.0288 
      0.6164 
School/Education 0.3095  0.2014  0.1081** 
      0.0413 
Sanitation 0.2698  0.1528  0.1171** 
      0.0179 
Drainage 0.2619  0.2083  0.0535715 
      0.3009 
Bus and road  0.1508  0.1944  -0.0436507 
      0.3472 
Group houses  0.0159  0.1944  -0.1786*** 
      0.000 
Individual pipeline or toilet connection  0.0952  0.0764  0.0188 
      0.582 
Streetlights 0.0714  0.0972  -0.0258 
      0.451 
Notes: - P-values are given in italics. 
- Significant at ***1%, **5%, and *10%. 
Provision 
Analogous to our analysis of female-reserved and unreserved GPs in the previous section, we next test 
whether the differences in preferences for pubic goods by SC and non-SC persons are reflected in the 
provision of public goods by GP presidents of each type (Table 12). We again use a DID estimation 
strategy; however, in this case we need to be concerned with endogeneity in GP selection for SC 
reservation. SC villages were shown earlier to have smaller populations and greater SC populations 
compared to unreserved villages. Therefore, we also test the robustness of the DID estimation results by 
using a matching estimation strategy.   
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Table 12. DID estimation without controls for GPs reserved and unreserved for SC presidents 
   (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
   Reserved for SC  Unreserved GPs  Time Period Difference 
DID 
Estimator 







2005 Reserved  Unreserved 
Number  of  borewells  2.59 6.63  3.09 5.76  4.04  2.67  1.37* 
(3.20) (7.62)  (3.00) (5.16)  [1.17]  [0.26]  [0.78] 
Distance to nearest 
borewell 
0.23 0.30  0.23 0.21  0.07  -0.02 0.09** 
(0.20) (0.42)  (0.23) (0.21)  [0.07]  [0.01]  [0.04] 
HEALTH -  
Composite Measure 
a 
-0.13 0.29 -0.20 0.16  0.42  0.36  0.06 
(0.64) (1.03)  (0.82) (1.16)  [0.13]  [0.06]  [0.15] 
Distance to nearest 
concrete road 
a 
0.33 0.26  0.39 0.21  -0.07  -0.18  0.11* 
(0.32) (0.34)  (0.35) (0.29)  [0.04]  [0.02]  [0.06] 
Number  of  schools  2.17 2.83  2.55 3.41  0.65  0.85  -0.20 
(1.23) (2.12)  (1.52) (2.14)  [0.36]  [0.12]  [0.32] 
Number of public toilets  0.35  1.43  0.50  2.39  1.09  1.89  -0.80 
(0.49) (0.95)  (1.00) (5.22)  [0.20]  [0.41]  [0.94] 
Number of bus and 
minibus trips 
7.78 11.48  8.44 13.55  3.70  5.12  -1.42 
(10.37) (14.11)  (9.37) (14.46)  [1.14]  [0.67]  [1.61] 
Household pipeline or 
toilet connection 
-0.31 0.20 -0.28 0.30  0.51  0.58  -0.06 
(0.08) (0.68)  (0.16) (0.96)  [0.14]  [0.09]  [0.21] 
STREETLIGHTS - 
Composite measure 
-0.50 0.01 -0.31 0.40  0.51  0.70  -0.19 
(0.48) (0.68)  (0.77) (1.15)  [0.07]  [0.06]  [0.13] 
Notes: Standard Deviations are given in (parentheses). 
Standard Errors are given in [brackets]. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
Public goods measures are taken at the GP level; the number of observations per time period is 144 unless noted. 
a These measures included 143 GPs due to missing data in one GP. 
A t-test of the difference in 1991 means between reserved and unreserved villages shows no statistically significant difference for 
any of the above measures. 
Results 
Similar to the case of men and women, we find that SC and non-SC persons have different preferences for 
public goods. We also find very interesting differences in the provisions of drinking water—in the form 
of borewells—and roads. Notably, SC presidents in SC-reserved GPs provide significantly more 
borewells than their counterparts, yet the distance to the nearest borewell is farther away from the village 
center in SC-reserved villages. How can we interpret this? 
It is very common in rural Indian villages—and Tamil Nadu is no exception— that SC persons 
often live in isolated areas of the village. In our sample, the SC-inhabited areas are separated from the 
main village in 93 percent of villages. Therefore, our finding that SC-reserved villages have more 
borewells that are farther away from the village center suggests that new borewells are being dug in the 
SC-inhabited areas of the villages, which are farther away from the village center. This is consistent with 
the SC preference for drinking water as an important public good. This finding is consistent with the 
results of Besley et al. (2004), who observe that SC leaders tend to invest in certain public goods that 
favor the SC population. 
In the case of roads, the story is less clear. With limited resources, the provision of other public 
goods, such as roads, may have to be sacrificed or delayed due to the SC presidents’ greater investments  
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in borewells. Or, similar to the case of the borewells, it may be that the concrete roads are being built in 
the relatively isolated SC-inhabited areas. We are unable to speculate strongly on this matter because we 
have only one measure of roads. 
Given the non-random nature of assigning SC reservations, combined with the large variance in 
SC population ratios within some blocks, it is particularly important to check that these results are robust 
to the addition of several covariates to the DID estimation. Accordingly, we repeat the regression with the 
addition of variables controlling for the following: GP female population ratio in 1991, GP SC population 
ratio in 1991, GP total population in 1991, GP total population of children six years or younger, a dummy 
variable indicating the president’s membership in the AIADMK political party in 2005, the number of 
villages that comprise the GP, the total cultivated land area of the GP, and the block level.
23 The results 
are given in Table 13. Our interesting findings of provision and placement of borewells by SC presidents 
in reserved GPs are unchanged. Table 13 shows that SC-reserved GPs provide more borewells, and that 
these are located farther away from the city center. 
Our results confirm the findings from the previous DID estimation in sign and magnitude, though 
the statistical significance of the differences is not strong. In the specification with controls, we also find 
that the measure of health care in the village is significantly lower in SC-reserved GPs. However, we 
believe our findings support our claim that SC presidents are by and large not providing less public goods 
than their non-SC counterparts, and are even providing more of one good (borewells) that they prefer. 
Additionally, a DID Propensity Score Matching (DID PSM) estimation procedure (see Appendix) finds 
similar results, in that SC-reserved GPs are found to have more borewells, located farther away. The DID 
PSM result agrees with the DID results in sign and magnitude, though not in statistical significance. 
Similar to the case of reserved-female presidents, we see that the number of villages in a GP and 
a president's membership in AIADMK lead to greater public goods provision. While the number of 
villages per GP does not significantly differ between SC-reserved and unreserved GPs,
24 significantly 
more reserved-SC presidents compared to non-SC presidents are affiliated with AIADMK (83 and 56 
percent, respectively).
25 The better political-connectedness that comes with membership in the power 
party may explain part of the success SC presidents have in supplying more borewells. Indeed, a 
regression of ‘contact with higher level panchayat officials’ on GP reservation status shows that reserved-
SC and non-SC presidents are generally equally well-connected to higher-level politicians (Table 14). 
 
                                                      
23 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) is also a suitable analysis for a robustness check of our results, although it is very 
similar to our DID estimation with covariates and tends to be a more controversial empirical method. The main difference 
between PSM and our DID estimation with covariates is that calculating the propensity score based on GP SC and female 1991 
population ratios, GP total 1991 population, GP total 1991 population of children six years or younger, and total cultivated land 
area of the GP allows for a non-linear effect of these factors on public goods outcomes. When we perform a DID PSM estimation 
using all five of these variables to calculate the propensity score, the results are consistent with those from the DID estimation 
with covariates. The DID PSM estimation technique and results are given in the Appendix. 
24 SC-reserved GPs have 6.1 villages per GP on average, versus 6.4 for unreserved GPs, with a p-value of 0.80. 
25 This difference is significantly different from zero at a five percent level of significance.  
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Table 13. DID estimation with controls for gps reserved and unreserved for SC presidents 



























1.825 0.110  -0.691**  0.0189  -0.151 0.0589  1.093  -0.0712  -0.242 
(1.43) (0.070)  (0.30)  (0.11) (0.56) (1.22)  (4.16)  (0.18)  (0.29) 
SC Reservation  -0.446  0.00344  0.0614  -0.0632 -0.343 -0.152  -0.626  -0.0335  -0.200 
(0.92) (0.045)  (0.19) (0.070) (0.36) (0.78)  (2.67)  (0.11)  (0.19) 
2005 -15.98  -0.372  8.423***  1.049  -9.349* 11.37 -56.58  -1.236  -3.741 
(14.3) (0.70) (2.97) (1.11)  (5.60) (12.2)  (41.6)  (1.78)  (2.92) 
1991 SC 
Population Ratio 
-1.996 -0.235  0.702 0.242 2.001 -1.850  -8.333  0.185  0.916 
(3.18) (0.16) (0.66) (0.25)  (1.25) (2.70)  (9.24)  (0.39)  (0.65) 
1991 Female 
Population Ratio 
10.82 1.186 1.440  -1.043  -4.476 -10.83  50.40  1.766  -0.121 
(23.7) (1.16) (4.93) (1.84)  (9.30) (20.2)  (68.9)  (2.95)  (4.84) 
# Villages in GP  0.157*  -0.000920  0.0444**  0.000435 0.169***  0.0359  0.160  0.0839***  0.0926*** 
(0.083) (0.0040)  (0.017) (0.0063) (0.032) (0.070)  (0.24)  (0.010)  (0.017) 
AIADMK Party  -0.193  0.0175  0.480***  -0.0432 -0.0194  -0.563  3.681*  0.0879 0.418*** 
(0.76) (0.037)  (0.16) (0.058) (0.30) (0.65)  (2.21)  (0.095)  (0.16) 
LN 1991 GP 
Population 
2.069 0.0261  -1.196*** -0.114  1.223** -1.070  1.129  0.133  0.437 
(1.51) (0.074)  (0.31)  (0.12) (0.59) (1.29)  (4.40)  (0.19)  (0.31) 
LN 1991 GP 
Population < 6 
-1.004 0.000633  0.112  0.0497  0.279 2.131*  2.871  0.00317  0.0941 




0.655 -0.0168 -0.0783 -0.0364  -0.0241 -0.900*  2.040  -0.00915  -0.0197 
(0.60) (0.029)  (0.13) (0.046) (0.24) (0.51)  (1.76)  (0.075)  (0.12) 
Vellore District  -1.757  -0.317***  0.332  0.289*** 0.153  -2.189**  -9.271***  -0.886***  -0.610*** 
(1.13) (0.055)  (0.24) (0.087) (0.44) (0.96)  (3.29)  (0.14)  (0.23) 
Pudukottai District  -5.528***  -0.504***  -0.960*** 0.146* 0.163 0.171 -5.376*  -1.106***  -0.262 
(1.09) (0.053)  (0.23) (0.084) (0.43) (0.93)  (3.17)  (0.14)  (0.22) 
Constant 3.033***  0.229***  -0.192**  0.392*** 2.517***  0.500  8.408***  -0.278***  -0.303*** 
(0.37) (0.018) (0.078) (0.028) (0.14) (0.31)  (1.07)  (0.046)  (0.075) 
Observations  286 286 282 283  285  285 286  286  286 
R-squared 0.29  0.35  0.32  0.17 0.32 0.12  0.15  0.53  0.34 
Notes: Observations are at the GP level in 1991 and 2005. 
Time-invariant variables are interacted with year to capture effects due to reservation selection based on 1991 population data. 




Table 14. Reserved-SC presidents’ contact with higher-level panchayat officials 
   Contact with the 
Block Development Officer 
Contact with the 
Panchayat Union Chairman 
Contact with the 
District Panchayat Chairman    
SC 
Reservation 
.066 00.022  -0.091 -0.135   -0.028 -0.041
(0.08) (0.09)  (0.12) (0.11)   (0.08) (0.09)  
Test Score 
0.061***  0.060*** 0.098***  0.099*** 0.043***   0.043***
(0.01)  (0.01) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.01)   (0.01)
Constant 
-2.473*** 1.154*** -2.319*** -4.592*** 1.066*** -4.693*** -4.264*** -1.296*** -4.294***
(0.81) (0.21) (0.78) (1.01) (0.21) (1.00) (0.98) (0.22) (0.97)
Observations  144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144
Notes: Observations are at the GP level in 2005. 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The values listed for the "SC Reservation" and "Test Score" variables are the marginal effects estimated using the coefficients 
obtained from fitting a logistic regression to the data, which give the change in the probability of having high contact with the 
official as the independent variable changes. 
"Contact with the…" refers to the frequency of contact between the GP president and the listed official. In the case of the Block 
Development Officer, the dependent variable for contact equals 0 (low contact) if the president answered that contact happened 
"never," "rarely," or "sometimes," and equals 1 (high contact) if the president answered "frequently." In the case of the Panchayat 
Union Chairman and the District Panchayat Chairman, the dependent variable for contact equals 0 (low contact) if the president 
answered "never" or "rarely," and equals 1 (high contact) if the president answered "sometimes" or "frequently." 
Discussion 
SC presidents in SC-reserved GPs behave similarly to their non-SC counterparts in provision of nearly all 
public goods, with the major exception of borewells, an important source of potable water in rural India. 
The results of the simple DID estimation show that SC-reserved villages have more borewells, but that 
they are located on average farther away from the village center. This strongly suggests that SC presidents 
favor the SC-inhabited areas (i.e. isolated areas) for the locations of borewells. These results hold in sign 
and magnitude—though not strongly in statistical significance—when we correct for the non-random 
reservation process using DID estimation including covariates. 
This is a surprising and exciting result. Our finding that SC presidents do not generally provide 
fewer public goods—despite having lower scores on the knowledge test and less experience in office—is 
encouraging in light of India's reservation policies. Furthermore, our preliminary results suggesting that 
SC presidents provide more borewells to isolated SC-inhabited village areas is a real-world example of 
one of the oft-cited benefits of decentralization. In this case, government leaders at the local level have 
better knowledge of where and what public goods are most needed. Indeed, the SC-inhabited areas of 
villages tend to be the poorest in terms of people and infrastructure. 
SC presidents do not lean towards their preferences regarding the provision of other public goods, 
but this is not too surprising if we believe the median voter theorem. In all but four of the villages studied 
herein, SC persons comprise the minority of the village population. Therefore, despite their different 
preferences, SC presidents may be responding to the preferences of the median voters (i.e. non-SC 
persons) when making most decisions regarding public goods. However, in the case of their most 
preferred good—drinking water access—they seem to favor SC persons and SC-inhabited areas.  
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6.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This paper explores gram panchayats in Tamil Nadu state in India, in order to better understand the 
influence of a GP president's gender and caste on village public goods provision. We find that gender 
generally does not influence public goods outcomes—male and female presidents perform similarly 
overall. On the other hand, while we find that SC presidents also provide most public goods in line with 
their non-SC counterparts, SC presidents provide more drinking water access, and locate these access 
points more often in isolated SC-inhabited areas. The strong evidence that neither women nor SC 
presidents provide fewer public goods than their counterparts is encouraging. However, we find that the 
female presidents: (i) have lower knowledge of the GP; (ii) have little contact with higher-level panchayat 
officials; and (iii) anecdotally indicate that they are influenced by their husbands. The empirical evidence 
that reserved-women are not performing differently from men suggest that men may be involved in 
women’s presidencies.  Therefore, better training programs aimed at increasing the knowledge and 
understanding of the village governments could be especially beneficial for female presidents.  
In the present paper, we extend and build upon previous studies by including data from two time 
periods for many measures of public goods at the village level. Additionally, we include data from three 
districts in one state, and from three different levels of development, giving us a rich understanding of 
what is happening at the GP level in Tamil Nadu. Given the extremely diverse nature of India and her 
states, we can expect the effects of the panchayat system and the mandatory reservations to vary, making 





A.1. Errors in the Selection of GPs for Reservation 
The selection of GPs for reservation for women and SC persons is outlined in Section 2. However, this 
selection process exhibited errors. GPs below the threshold level of SC and female population ratios were 
mistakenly selected for reservation, and GPs above the threshold were mistakenly not selected for 
reservation. For each of the 12 blocks in our sample, the reservations and errors are shown in Figures 3-8. 
All reserved GPs (indicated by a value of ‘1’ on the vertical axis) should be located to the right of the 
threshold marking, while all GPs to the left of the threshold marking should be unreserved (indicated by a 
value of ‘0’ on the vertical axis). The error rate (calculated as reserved GPs that should not have been 
reserved) is 27.3 percent for women-reserved GPs and 39.1 percent for SC-reserved GPs. 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To ensure that the GPs selected (or not selected) in error do not contain systematic differences 
that might affect public goods provision, we compare village characteristics and public goods levels in 
1991 between GPs with and without errors in their reservation status. As shown in Tables 15 and 16, 
among GPs with and without errors in their SC reservation status, no statistically significant differences 
were found in village or public goods characteristics, except for the number of schools in the GP in 1991. 
We do not see this as a cause for concern, nor do we consider it to be strong evidence that unobserved 
factors affecting errors in SC reservation assignment may influence public goods provision. In Tables 17 
and 18, we see statistically significant differences in GP population measures between GPs with and 
without errors in women's reservations. The results show that, in GPs where the women's reservation had 
an error, the ratio of females in the population is higher, the GP has more children, and there are fewer 
Muslim and Christian households. Again, we do not see this as a cause for concern when examining the 
effect of the reservation policy. The higher female population ratio is simply due to the fact that, in our 
sample, the majority of errors in women's reservation occurred when GPs that should have been reserved 
(i.e. those having a high female population ratio) were not. The number of GPs with this error (25) is 
much larger than the number of GPs that were reserved that should not have been (9). Therefore, the GPs 
with errors necessarily have higher female population ratios. This may explain why there are more 
children in those GPs as well. The finding that there are fewer Muslim and Christian households in GPs 
with errors for women's reservations is interesting. However, as a proportion of the total households in the 
sampled GPs, Muslim households comprise about three percent of total households and Christian 
households comprise less than two percent. Having a difference among such a small proportion of the 






Table A.1. Differences in village characteristics in 1991: GPs with and without errors in reservation 
status for SC presidents 
Variable  Mean, GPs  




Village population - total  2660.921  2258.556  402.3651 
      0.2516 
Village population - under six years of age  325.6429  256.5556  69.0873 
      0.1589 
Ratio of females to total population  0.4961983  0.5016464   -.0054481  
      0.1911 
Backward Caste (BC) population  739.881  1089.556  -349.6746 
      0.2834 
Scheduled Caste (SC) population  551.619  642.9444   -91.3254  
      0.355 
Households total  597.2619  542.7778  54.48413 
      0.5207 
Hindu households  566.8413  525.2778  41.56349 
      0.6199 
Muslim households  19.53968  11.66667  7.873016 
      0.2001 
Christian households  10.88095  5.833333   5.047619  
       0.2003 
Farm households  327.1429  313.3889  13.754 
      0.7948 
Village citizens working in village  562.8968  527.7222  35.1746 
      0.7415 
Female village citizens working in village  258.119  237.5556  20.5634 
      0.6829 
Total cultivated land (acres) 2140.898  2733.781  -592.8824 
      0.1625 
Literates 1231.159  1056.167  174.9921 
      0.3509 
Notes: - P-values are given in italics. 
- Indicates significance at *10%, **5%, ***1%.  
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Table A.2. Differences in public goods in 1991: GPs with and without errors in reservation status 
for SC presidents 
Variable  Mean, GPs  
with no errors 
Mean, GPs 
with errors  Difference 
Number of borewells  2.972222 3.277778- 0 .305556 
0.6903 
Distance to nearest borewell  0.2234127 0.2888889 -0.0654762 
0.244 
HEALTH - Composite measure  -0.1756144 -0.2528674 0.077253 
0.6994 
Distance to nearest concrete road  0.379032 0.3972222 -0.0181902 
0.8355 
Number of schools  2.563492 1.944444 0.619048* 
0.0975 
Number of public toilets  0.4920635 0.3333333 0.1587302 
0.5039 
Number of bus and minibus trips  7.888889 11.44444 -3.555551 
0.1381 
Household pipeline or toilet connection  -0.2770827 -0.3294424 0.0523597 
0.1679 
STREETLIGHTS - Composite measure -0.3305746 -0.3797159 0.0491413 
0.7911 
- P-values are given in italics. 
- Indicates significance at *10%, **5%, ***1%.  
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Table A.3. Differences in village characteristics in 1991: GPS with and without errors in 
reservation status for female presidents 
Variable 
Mean, 
GPs with no Errors 
Mean, 
GPs with Errors  Difference 
Village population – total  2733.555 2212.912 520.6428*
      0.0557 
Village population - under six years of age  336.0727  255.3235  80.7492** 
      0.0337 
Ratio of females to total population  0.4936764  0.5072417  -.0135653*** 
      0.0000 
Backward Caste (BC) population  770.4364  826.1471  -55.7107 
      0.8266 
Scheduled Caste (SC) population  556.7636  583.3235  -26.55989 
      0.7301 
Households total  613.7  515.2353  98.46471 
      0.1348 
Hindu households  580.7545  499.8235  80.93102 
      0.2138 
Muslim households  21.04545  10.5  10.54545** 
      0.0267 
Christian households  11.9  4.911765  6.988235** 
      0.0219 
Farm households  335.0273  294.3529  40.67433 
      0.3226 
Village citizens working in village  558.9273  557.1176  1.809626 
      0.9826 
Female village citizens working in village  252.1273  266.6176  -14.49037 
      0.7117 
Total cultivated land (acres) 2125.075  2505.969  -380.8941 
      0.2497 
Literates 1262.855  1035.971  226.884 
      0.1194 
Notes:- P-values are given in italics. 
- Indicates significance at *10%, **5%, ***1%.  
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Table A.4. Differences in public goods in 1991: GPs with and without errors in reservation status 
for female presidents 
Variable  Mean, GPs  
with no errors 
Mean, GPs 
with errors  Difference 
Number of borewells  2.977273  3.117647  -0.140374 
      0.8142 
Distance to nearest borewell  0.2322727 0.2294118  0.0028609 
      0.948 
HEALTH - Composite measure  -0.2126313 -0.1000188  -0.1126125 
      0.4703  
Distance to nearest concrete road  0.3916055 0.3483529  0.0432526 
      0.526 
Number of schools  2.509091 2.411765  0.097326 
      0.7391 
Number of public toilets  0.5272727 0.2941176  0.2331551 
      0.2065 
Number of bus and minibus trips  8.245455 8.617647  -0.372192 
      0.8426 
Household pipeline or toilet connection  -0.2751652 -0.3110063  0.0358411 
      0.2258 
STREETLIGHTS - Composite measure  -0.3512709 -0.289632  -0.0616389 
       0.6696  
- P-values are given in italics. 
- Indicates significance at *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
A.2. Other Model Specifications for DID with Covariates 
Tables 19-22 show various specifications of DID estimation with controls in women-reserved GPs, while 
Tables 24-27 show various specifications of DID estimation with controls in SC-reserved GPs. The 
results are consistent with the model specifications discussed in the main text. One item of interest is that 
Tables 23 and 28 include a dummy variable indicating whether the president is serving his/her second 
consecutive term in office (i.e. he/she was in office from 1996-2005 in our data set). The inclusion of this 




Table A.5. DID estimation with covariates for GPs reserved and unreserved for female presidents (I) 




















0.277 0.00468  0.00624  0.00643  -0.409  -0.535 0.110  -0.109  -0.132 
(1.27) (0.068)  (0.28)  (0.092)  (0.52)  (1.00)  (3.51)  (0.18)  (0.27) 
Woman 
Reservation 
0.187 0.0317  0.0726  -0.0871  -0.103  -0.246  0.335  -0.00141  -0.0673 
(0.89) (0.048)  (0.20)  (0.064)  (0.37)  (0.69)  (2.45)  (0.13)  (0.19) 
2005 39.54***  1.999***  -0.245  -1.141  9.043*  0.495  26.84  6.593***  4.217* 
(11.4) (0.61)  (2.53)  (0.82)  (4.70)  (8.91)  (31.5) (1.66)  (2.39) 
1991 Female 
Population Ratio 
-73.89*** -4.042***  1.231  1.970  -16.34*  2.788  -44.23 -12.08***  -7.072 
(23.0) (1.23)  (5.10)  (1.66)  (9.49)  (18.0)  (63.5) (3.34)  (4.83) 
Constant  2.969*** 0.225***  -
0.202**  0.401*** 2.509***  0.527  8.259***  -0.283***  -0.322*** 
(0.42) (0.022)  (0.094)  (0.030)  (0.17)  (0.33)  (1.16) (0.061)  (0.088) 
Observations 288  288  284  285  287  287  288  288  288 
R-squared  0.13 0.04  0.04  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.04 0.20  0.13 
Notes: Observations are at the GP level in 1991 and 2005. 
Time-invariant variables are interacted with year to capture effects due to reservation selection based on 1991 population data. 
Standard errors are given in (parentheses). 





Table A.6. DID estimation with covariates for GPs reserved and unreserved for female presidents (II) 






















-0.197 -0.0194  0.126  0.0340  -0.601 -0.504  -0.915  -0.201  -0.243 
(1.22) (0.066)  (0.27)  (0.090)  (0.48)  (1.00)  (3.41)  (0.17)  (0.25) 
Woman Reservation  0.187  0.0317  0.0726  -0.0871 -0.103  -0.246  0.335  -0.00141  -0.0673 
(0.85) (0.046)  (0.19)  (0.062)  (0.33)  (0.69)  (2.37)  (0.12)  (0.17) 
2005 -10.79  -0.275  10.72***  1.465  -13.28**  2.526  -83.07**  -3.078  -7.724** 
(14.9) (0.80)  (3.26)  (1.10)  (5.78)  (12.1)  (41.4)  (2.07)  (3.05) 
1991 Female 
Population Ratio 
-33.70 -2.090  -8.326  -0.569  -1.427 0.398  50.86  -4.367  1.954 
(23.6) (1.27)  (5.18)  (1.74)  (9.20)  (19.3)  (65.9)  (3.29)  (4.85) 
1991 SC Population 
Ratio 
4.581 0.332**  1.229**  0.119 0.954  -3.578  -3.653  0.721* 0.466 
(2.78) (0.15)  (0.61)  (0.20)  (1.08)  (2.27)  (7.75)  (0.39)  (0.57) 
LN 1991 GP Population  2.978**  0.164**  -1.084***  -0.219**  1.428**  -0.284  5.545  0.617***  0.898*** 
(1.50) (0.081)  (0.33)  (0.11)  (0.58)  (1.23)  (4.19)  (0.21)  (0.31) 
LN 1991 GP Population 
< 6 
-0.739 -0.122*  0.530* 0.205**  0.768  0.870  -1.975  -0.152  -0.0526 
(1.26) (0.068)  (0.28)  (0.092)  (0.49)  (1.03)  (3.50)  (0.17)  (0.26) 
LN Total Cultivated 
Land 1991 
1.422*** 0.0879***  -0.150  -0.112*** -0.0793  -0.365  4.304***  0.240***  0.0985 
(0.54) (0.029)  (0.12)  (0.040)  (0.21)  (0.44)  (1.51)  (0.075)  (0.11) 
Constant 2.969***  0.225***  -0.202**  0.401***  2.509***  0.527  8.259***  -0.283***  -0.322*** 
(0.40) (0.022)  (0.089)  (0.029)  (0.16)  (0.33)  (1.12)  (0.056)  (0.082) 
Observations 288  288  284  285  287  287  288  288  288 
R-squared 0.21  0.12  0.15  0.14  0.25  0.08  0.11  0.34  0.25 
Notes: Observations are at the GP level in 1991 and 2005. 
Time-invariant variables are interacted with year to capture effects due to reservation selection based on 1991 population data. 
Standard errors are given in (parentheses); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table A.7. DID estimation with covariates for GPs reserved and unreserved for female presidents (III) 





















-0.664 -0.0763  -0.0117  0.0513  -0.432 -0.471  -1.570  -0.294*  -0.223 
(1.19) (0.057)  (0.27) (0.089)  (0.53)  (1.00)  (3.45)  (0.17)  (0.27) 
Woman Reservation  0.188  0.0317  0.0726  -0.0871 -0.103 -0.246  0.335  -0.00141  -0.0673 
(0.83) (0.039)  (0.19) (0.061)  (0.37)  (0.69)  (2.39)  (0.11)  (0.18) 
2005 7.891  -0.505  -3.359  -0.263  7.544  5.945  -12.89  1.226  1.888 
(11.6) (0.55)  (2.59) (0.87)  (5.14)  (9.64)  (33.4)  (1.61)  (2.59) 
1991 Female 
Population Ratio 
-3.648 1.579  7.448  -0.167  -13.24  -8.344  48.88 0.0852  -1.683 
(23.8) (1.13)  (5.32) (1.79)  (10.6)  (19.8)  (68.6)  (3.30)  (5.31) 
Vellore District  -2.750***  -0.306***  0.652***  0.337*** 0.184  -0.838  -10.17***  -0.809***  -0.502** 
(0.87) (0.041)  (0.19) (0.065)  (0.39)  (0.73)  (2.52)  (0.12)  (0.19) 
Pudukottai District  -6.376***  -0.508***  -0.578***  0.187*** -0.293  1.039  -8.304***  -1.096*** -0.483** 
(0.94) (0.045)  (0.21) (0.071)  (0.42)  (0.78)  (2.71)  (0.13)  (0.21) 
Constant 2.969***  0.225***  -0.202**  0.401***  2.509***  0.527  8.259***  -0.283***  -0.322*** 
(0.39) (0.019)  (0.088) (0.029)  (0.17)  (0.32)  (1.13)  (0.054)  (0.087) 
Observations 288  288  284  285  287  287  288  288  288 
R-squared  0.25 0.35  0.16 0.16  0.07  0.09  0.10  0.37  0.15 
Notes: Observations are at the GP level in 1991 and 2005. 
Time-invariant variables are interacted with year to capture effects due to reservation selection based on 1991 population data. 
Standard errors are given in (parentheses). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table A.8. DID estimation with covariates for GPs reserved and unreserved for female presidents (IV) 





















-0.672 -0.0764  -0.0113  0.0518  -0.443 -0.463  -1.594  -0.295*  -0.226 
(1.19) (0.057)  (0.27) (0.089)  (0.52)  (1.00)  (3.44)  (0.17)  (0.27) 
Woman 
Reservation 
0.467  0.0330 0.0454  -0.108*  0.192  -0.372 1.143  0.0310 0.0284 
(0.87) (0.041)  (0.19) (0.064)  (0.38)  (0.72)  (2.50)  (0.12)  (0.19) 
2005  7.034 -0.509  -3.280 -0.191  6.682  6.327  -15.37  1.126  1.594 
(11.6) (0.55)  (2.60) (0.87)  (5.10)  (9.67)  (33.5)  (1.61)  (2.59) 
1991 Female 
Population Ratio 
-1.958 1.587  7.294  -0.310  -11.54  -9.095  53.78  0.282  -1.104 
(23.8) (1.13)  (5.34) (1.79)  (10.5)  (19.9)  (68.8)  (3.31)  (5.31) 
Test Score  0.105 0.000499  -0.0104 -0.00789  0.111**  -0.0474  0.303 0.0122  0.0359 
(0.098) (0.0047)  (0.022) (0.0073)  (0.043) (0.082)  (0.28)  (0.014)  (0.022) 
Vellore District  -2.645*** -0.306***  0.642***  0.329***  0.301 -0.888  -9.864*** -0.797*** -0.466** 
(0.88) (0.042)  (0.20) (0.065)  (0.39)  (0.73)  (2.53)  (0.12)  (0.20) 
Pudukottai District  -6.424*** -0.508***  -0.574***  0.191***  -0.343 1.058  -8.444***  -1.102***  -0.499** 
(0.94) (0.045)  (0.21) (0.071)  (0.41)  (0.79)  (2.71)  (0.13)  (0.21) 
Constant  1.893* 0.219***  -0.0957 0.482***  1.374***  1.013  5.147*  -0.408***  -0.690*** 
(1.08) (0.051)  (0.24) (0.080)  (0.47)  (0.90)  (3.12)  (0.15)  (0.24) 
Observations  288 288  284 285  287  287  288  288  288 
R-squared  0.25 0.35  0.16 0.16  0.10  0.09  0.10  0.38  0.16 
Notes: Observations are at the GP level in 1991 and 2005. 
Standard errors are given in (parentheses). 
Time-invariant variables are interacted with year to capture effects due to reservation selection based on 1991 population data. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table A.9. DID estimation with covariates for GPs reserved and unreserved for female presidents (V) 






















-0.662 -0.0762  -0.0110  0.0529  -0.436 -0.484  -1.652  -0.297*  -0.225 
(1.20) (0.057) (0.27)  (0.088)  (0.53)  (1.00) (3.42)  (0.17) (0.27) 
Woman 
Reservation 
0.172 0.0307  0.0659  -0.0984  -0.0790  -0.168 0.918  0.0162  -0.0542 
(0.83) (0.040) (0.19)  (0.062)  (0.37)  (0.69) (2.39)  (0.12) (0.19) 
2005  8.027 -0.496  -3.302  -0.147  7.331  5.272  -17.99  1.072  1.773 
(11.6) (0.55)  (2.60)  (0.87)  (5.16)  (9.66)  (33.3)  (1.61)  (2.60) 
1991 Female 
Population Ratio 
-3.925 1.561  7.334  -0.402  -12.81  -6.978  59.24  0.398  -1.450 
(23.9) (1.13)  (5.34)  (1.79)  (10.6)  (19.8)  (68.3)  (3.30)  (5.33) 
Second Term for 
President 
-0.0942 -0.00603 -0.0426  -0.0676*  0.143 0.468  3.528**  0.107 0.0794 
(0.55) (0.026) (0.12)  (0.041)  (0.24)  (0.46) (1.57)  (0.076) (0.12) 
Vellore District  -2.754*** -0.307*** 0.650***  0.334*** 0.190 -0.812  -9.990***  -0.804*** -0.498** 
(0.87) (0.042) (0.20)  (0.065)  (0.39)  (0.73) (2.50)  (0.12) (0.20) 
Pudukottai District  -6.368*** -0.508***  -0.575***  0.194***  -0.305 1.003  -8.592***  -1.105***  -0.489** 
(0.94) (0.045) (0.21)  (0.071)  (0.42)  (0.78) (2.69)  (0.13) (0.21) 
Constant  2.999*** 0.226*** -0.189*  0.423***  2.463** 0.376 7.125***  -0.318***  -0.347*** 
(0.43) (0.020)  (0.097)  (0.032)  (0.19)  (0.36) (1.23)  (0.059)  (0.096) 
Observations  288 288  284  285  287  287  288  288  288 
R-squared  0.25 0.35  0.16  0.16  0.08  0.09  0.11  0.38  0.15 
Notes: Observations are at the GP level in 1991 and 2005. 
Time-invariant variables are interacted with year to capture effects due to reservation selection based on 1991 population data. 
Standard errors are given in (parentheses). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table A.10. DID estimation with covariates for GPs reserved and unreserved for SC presidents (I) 























1.389 0.0771  -0.355  0.0534  -0.323  -0.307  0.571 -0.118  -0.267 
(1.58)  (0.084)  (0.34)  (0.11)  (0.64)  (1.21) (4.26) (0.23) (0.32) 
SC Reservation  -0.504  0.00120  0.0652  -0.0624 -0.372  -0.148  -0.655 -0.0329  -0.198 
(1.03)  (0.055)  (0.22) (0.073)  (0.42)  (0.79) (2.78) (0.15) (0.21) 
2005  2.686***  -0.0345 -0.101  -0.236***  0.742**  2.443*** 7.288*** 0.519*** 0.622*** 
(0.88)  (0.047)  (0.19) (0.063)  (0.36)  (0.68) (2.38) (0.13) (0.18) 
1991 SC Population 
Ratio 
-0.0824 0.0594  2.304***  0.300  0.614  -2.764 -10.96  0.294  0.413 
(3.35) (0.18)  (0.72)  (0.24)  (1.37)  (2.57) (9.06) (0.49) (0.69) 
Constant 3.091***  0.231***  -0.196**  0.391***  2.545***  0.496  8.438***  -0.278***  -0.305*** 
(0.41) (0.022)  (0.089)  (0.029)  (0.17)  (0.31)  (1.11) (0.060) (0.085) 
Observations  288 288  284  285  287  287 288 288 288 
R-squared  0.10 0.01  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.07 0.05 0.16 0.13 
Notes: Observations are at the GP level in 1991 and 2005. 
Time-invariant variables are interacted with year to capture effects due to reservation selection based on 1991 population data. 
Standard errors are given in (parentheses). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table A.11. DID estimation with covariates for GPs reserved and unreserved for SC presidents (II) 























1.995 0.0983 -0.483  0.0368 0.0635 -0.237  1.355 -0.00679  -0.103 
(1.49)  (0.080) (0.33)  (0.11) (0.58) (1.22) (4.16)  (0.21)  (0.31) 
SC Reservation  -0.504  0.00120  0.0652  -0.0624 -0.372 -0.148 -0.655 -0.0329 -0.198 
(0.96)  (0.052) (0.21)  (0.071) (0.38) (0.79) (2.69)  (0.14)  (0.20) 
2005  -11.33  -0.360  10.08***  1.690 -10.53*  5.445  -81.23**  -2.294 -6.457** 
(14.4) (0.78) (3.16)  (1.08) (5.66) (11.8) (40.3)  (2.03)  (2.97) 
1991 SC Population 
Ratio 
2.507 0.195  1.829***  0.150 1.314  -3.112  -4.680  0.758*  0.855 
(3.19) (0.17) (0.70)  (0.24) (1.25) (2.61) (8.91)  (0.45)  (0.66) 
1991 Female 
Population Ratio 
-34.01 -2.027 -6.966  -0.913 -5.925 -4.279 46.97 -5.674*  -0.00955 
(22.9) (1.23) (5.01)  (1.69) (8.98) (18.7) (63.9)  (3.21)  (4.71) 
LN 1991 GP 
Population 
3.181** 0.180**  -1.101***  -0.233** 1.242**  -0.466  5.523  0.570***  0.793** 
(1.49)  (0.080) (0.33)  (0.11) (0.59) (1.23) (4.18)  (0.21)  (0.31) 
LN 1991 GP 
Population < 6 
-0.809 -0.129* 0.522*  0.214** 0.881*  0.969 -1.927  -0.121 0.00532 
(1.25)  (0.067) (0.27)  (0.092) (0.49) (1.03) (3.49)  (0.18)  (0.26) 
LN Total Cultivated 
Land 1991 
1.372**  0.0845*** -0.135  -0.112***  -0.0704 -0.355  4.279*** 0.241***  0.108 
(0.54)  (0.029) (0.12)  (0.040) (0.21) (0.44) (1.51)  (0.076)  (0.11) 
Constant  3.091*** 0.231*** -0.196**  0.391*** 2.545***  0.496 8.438***  -0.278*** -0.305*** 
(0.39)  (0.021)  (0.085)  (0.028) (0.15) (0.32) (1.08)  (0.054) (0.079) 
Observations  288 288 284  285 287 287 288  288  288 
R-squared  0.22 0.12 0.15  0.13 0.24 0.08 0.11  0.33  0.24 
Notes: Observations are at the GP level in 1991 and 2005. 
Time-invariant variables are interacted with year to capture effects due to reservation selection based on 1991 population data. 




Table A.12. DID estimation with covariates for GPs reserved and unreserved for SC presidents (III) 






















1.742  0.110 -0.400  0.0228  -0.328 -0.268  1.446  -0.0366  -0.222 
(1.44)  (0.068) (0.32)  (0.11)  (0.64) (1.20)  (4.15)  (0.20)  (0.32) 
SC Reservation  -0.504  0.00120  0.0652  -0.0624 -0.372  -0.148 -0.655 -0.0329  -0.198 
(0.94)  (0.044) (0.21)  (0.070)  (0.42) (0.78)  (2.70)  (0.13)  (0.21) 
2005 6.729***  0.282***  -0.0422  -0.411***  0.974**  2.159***  13.44***  1.252***  0.978*** 
(0.98)  (0.046) (0.22)  (0.074)  (0.44) (0.82)  (2.82)  (0.14)  (0.22) 
1991 SC 
Population Ratio 
-4.432 -0.211  1.610**  0.302  0.0842  -1.597  -12.96  -0.252  0.225 
(3.13)  (0.15) (0.70)  (0.24)  (1.40) (2.61)  (9.03)  (0.44)  (0.70) 
Vellore District  -2.741***  -0.294***  0.698***  0.335*** 0.176  -0.789  -9.434***  -0.772***  -0.462** 
(0.84)  (0.040) (0.19)  (0.063)  (0.38) (0.71)  (2.44)  (0.12)  (0.19) 
Pudukottai District  -6.594***  -0.486***  -0.387**  0.203*** -0.504 0.827  -8.083***  -1.093***  -0.498*** 
(0.85)  (0.041) (0.19)  (0.065)  (0.38) (0.72)  (2.46)  (0.12)  (0.19) 
Constant 3.091***  0.231***  -0.196**  0.391***  2.545***  0.496  8.438***  -0.278***  -0.305*** 
(0.37) (0.018)  (0.084) (0.028)  (0.17)  (0.31)  (1.08)  (0.053)  (0.084) 
Observations  288  288 284  285  287 287  288  288  288 
R-squared  0.26  0.35 0.17  0.16  0.07 0.09  0.10  0.36  0.16 
Notes: Observations are at the GP level in 1991 and 2005. 
Time-invariant variables are interacted with year to capture effects due to reservation selection based on 1991 population data. 
Standard errors are given in (parentheses). 




Table A.13. DID estimation with covariates for GPs reserved and unreserved for SC presidents (IV) 






















1.693  0.110  -0.393 0.0240  -0.397 -0.262 1.324  -0.0465  -0.243 
(1.44)  (0.068)  (0.32) (0.11)  (0.63) (1.20) (4.15)  (0.20)  (0.32) 
SC Reservation  -0.456  0.00116  0.0584  -0.0637 -0.310  -0.154  -0.534 -0.0229  -0.176 
(0.94)  (0.045)  (0.21) (0.070)  (0.41) (0.78) (2.71)  (0.13)  (0.21) 
2005 6.678***  0.282***  -0.0341  -0.409***  0.907**  2.167***  13.31***  1.242***  0.955*** 
(0.98)  (0.047)  (0.22) (0.074)  (0.43) (0.82) (2.82)  (0.14)  (0.22) 
1991 SC 
Population Ratio 
-4.258 -0.211  1.586**  0.298  0.322 -1.619  -12.52 -0.217  0.303 
(3.13)  (0.15)  (0.70) (0.24)  (1.38) (2.62) (9.05)  (0.44)  (0.70) 
Test Score  0.0905  -0.0000888  -0.0144  -0.00247  0.116***  -0.0114  0.228  0.0187  0.0404** 
(0.089) (0.0043)  (0.020)  (0.0067)  (0.039) (0.075) (0.26)  (0.013)  (0.020) 
Vellore District  -2.662***  -0.294***  0.686***  0.333*** 0.284  -0.800  -9.235***  -0.756***  -0.427** 
(0.85)  (0.040)  (0.19) (0.063)  (0.38) (0.71) (2.45)  (0.12)  (0.19) 
Pudukottai District  -6.616***  -0.486***  -0.384**  0.204*** -0.532  0.829  -8.140***  -1.098***  -0.508*** 
(0.85)  (0.041)  (0.19) (0.065)  (0.38) (0.72) (2.47)  (0.12)  (0.19) 
Constant 2.208**  0.232***  -0.0568  0.415***  1.417***  0.608  6.216**  -0.460***  -0.699*** 
(0.95)  (0.045)  (0.21) (0.071)  (0.42) (0.80) (2.74)  (0.13)  (0.21) 
Observations 288  288  284 285  287 287 288  288  288 
R-squared  0.26  0.35  0.17 0.16  0.10 0.09 0.10  0.37  0.17 
Observations are at the GP level in 1991 and 2005. 
Time-invariant variables are interacted with year to capture effects due to reservation selection based on 1991 population data. 
Standard errors are given in (parentheses). 




Table A.14. DID estimation with covariates for GPs reserved and unreserved for SC presidents (V) 






















1.742  0.110 -0.400  0.0224 -0.330 -0.272  1.409  -0.0379  -0.223 
(1.44)  (0.068) (0.32)  (0.11) (0.64) (1.20)  (4.12)  (0.20)  (0.32) 
SC Reservation  -0.506  0.000981  0.0638  -0.0642 -0.366 -0.133  -0.559 -0.0293  -0.195 
(0.94)  (0.045) (0.21)  (0.070) (0.42) (0.78)  (2.68)  (0.13)  (0.21) 
2005 6.729***  0.282***  -0.0426  -0.412***  0.975**  2.157***  13.45***  1.253***  0.978*** 
(0.98)  (0.046) (0.22)  (0.074) (0.44) (0.82)  (2.80)  (0.14)  (0.22) 
1991 SC 
Population Ratio 
-4.430 -0.210  1.615**  0.309  0.0754  -1.614  -13.07  -0.257 0.222 
(3.13)  (0.15) (0.70)  (0.24) (1.40) (2.61)  (8.97)  (0.44)  (0.70) 
Second Term for 
President 
-0.0613 -0.00784  -0.0701  -0.0578 0.208 0.536  3.389**  0.124  0.103 
(0.54)  (0.026) (0.12)  (0.040) (0.24) (0.45)  (1.54)  (0.075)  (0.12) 
Vellore District  -2.744***  -0.295***  0.694***  0.331*** 0.187  -0.753  -9.224*** -0.765***  -0.456** 
(0.85)  (0.040) (0.19)  (0.063) (0.38) (0.71)  (2.42)  (0.12)  (0.19) 
Pudukottai District  -6.591***  -0.486***  -0.385**  0.207*** -0.513  0.808  -8.228***  -1.098***  -0.502*** 
(0.86)  (0.041) (0.19)  (0.065) (0.38) (0.72)  (2.45)  (0.12)  (0.19) 
Constant 3.109***  0.234***  -0.177*  0.408***  2.485***  0.341  7.458***  -0.314***  -0.335*** 
(0.41)  (0.019)  (0.091)  (0.030) (0.18) (0.34)  (1.16)  (0.057)  (0.091) 
Observations  288  288 284  285 287 287  288  288  288 
R-squared  0.26  0.35 0.17  0.16 0.07 0.09  0.12  0.37  0.16 
Notes: Observations are at the GP level in 1991 and 2005. 
Time-invariant variables are interacted with year to capture effects due to reservation selection based on 1991 population data. 
Standard errors are given in (parentheses). 





A.3. Propensity Score Matching Estimation 
In the case of women's reservations, we argue that although women's reservations are based on female 
population ratios, the reservations are not related to any unobservable determinants of public goods 
provision. The additional observation that women-reserved GPs show no major differences versus non-
reserved GPs further supports this claim. We therefore propose that the DID estimation of the treatment 
effect for women-reserved GPs is reliable, and we show this is robust to model specifications controlling 
for the selection of reservation and other covariates. 
In the case of SC-reserved GPs, there are relatively larger differences in SC population ratios 
between GPs within a block, which could cause concern that different trends may exist in higher and 
lower SC-population ratio GPs. Therefore, in addition to the DID and DID with covariates estimation 
results presented in the main text, we also compare our DID estimates to propensity score matching 
estimators. 
A.3.1. An Explanation of Propensity Score Matching Estimation 
Matching estimation compares the outcomes of treated and untreated individuals by linking individuals 
with similar attributes. In propensity score matching, this linking is based on matching individuals with 
similar probabilities of receiving the treatment. The probability of receiving treatment is called the 
propensity score, and is calculated using a probit model of the form  
P(X) = Pr(D = 1|X), 
where X is a set of conditioning variables and D is an indicator variable for treatment. The idea 
behind matching is that, conditional on some variables X, the outcomes of the treated and untreated are 
independent (Heckman et al., 1997). 
The selection of variables used in calculating the propensity score for each village is a tricky 
issue, and the current literature is low on guidance and significance tests for the choice of conditioning 
variables (Gilligan and Hoddinott, 2007). In our case, however, we have an excellent set of variables on 
which to match. Because SC reservations were supposed to be made based on the SC population ratio in 
GPs, and because this rule was not strictly followed, we have a very natural conditioning variable of the 
SC population ratio. Additionally, our mean comparison indicates that SC reserved villages tend to be 
smaller. Thus, we use population measures and land area measures, in addition to the SC population ratio, 
to calculate the propensity score. 
The PSM estimator yields the average treatment effect on the treated, which tells us the average 
impact of reservation on GPs receiving them. In other words, the PSM estimator tells us by how much the 
reserved GPs' public goods provision differed from the public goods they would have received if they 
weren’t reserved. Because we have data from before and after reservation took place, we use a difference-
in-differences (DID) propensity score matching estimation procedure. Heckman et al. (1997) show that 
incorporating a DID component into PSM is generally superior to conventional PSM in terms of 
removing bias from the treatment effect estimates. Letting Y be the outcome variable of interest, t = 1, 2 
be the before- and after-treatment time periods of interest, respectively, and R and U stand for reserved 
and unreserved GPs, the DID PSM estimator is given by 




1) | X, D=1] 
= E[(YR
2 – YR
1) | X, D=1] – E[(YU
2 – YU
1) | X, D=1].  
A.3.2. Results from Propensity Score Matching Estimation 
Because PSM estimation can be sensitive to the choice of variables for calculating the propensity score, 
we use four different specifications for estimating the propensity score. All yield similar results, as shown 
in Table A.15.
26 The selection of variables for calculating the propensity score is straightforward; because 
                                                      
26 We thank Daniel Gilligan in the Food Consumption and Nutrition Division of IFPRI for sharing his Stata code for the  
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GPs were imperfectly selected for reservation based on their SC population ratio, a natural choice for one 
of our conditioning variables is a village's SC population ratio. In the specifications below, we use various 
combinations of the following variables for our estimation of the propensity score: the SC population 
ratio, total SC population, female population ratio, total female population, total village population, total 
village population under six years of age, and total village land area. In Table 3, we see that SC-reserved 
villages tend to be smaller in population, since higher-SC population ratio villages (which tend to be 
smaller) were given a reservation. We therefore use this, and other variables correlated with villages 
having a higher percentage of SC persons, as our conditioning variables. The estimates shown in Table 11 
are the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), i.e. the difference in public goods provision 
experienced by SC-reserved GPs, which would not have been present had these GPs not been reserved. 
These results confirm the findings from the DID estimation in sign and magnitude, though the 
statistical significance is not strong. Although not significant, the matching estimates are consistent with 
our finding that SC-reserved villages had an increase of one to two more borewells than non-SC reserved 
GPs. These results are also consistent—and significant in two specifications of the propensity score—
with the finding that the borewells are further away from the city center in SC-reserved GPs versus non-
SC-reserved GPs. 
A.3.3. Graphs of the Common Support for DID PSM in SC-Reserved GPs 
Figures 9-12 depict the regions of common support for the DID PSM estimation in SC-reserved GPs. The 
common support region identifies the areas where both treated and non-treated villages overlap in 
propensity score, allowing them to be ‘matched’ together in the analysis. 
Table A.15. DID PSM estimates of the average treatment effect on the treated 
   ATT: Difference in average change from 1991 to 2005 
   12 3   4
Number of borewells  1.71 1.90 1.24  1.41
(1.81) (1.83) (1.85)  (1.80)
Distance to nearest borewell  0.14 0.18 0.18*  0.18*
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11)  (0.10)
HEALTH - Composite measure  -0.24 -0.36 -0.04  -0.01
(0.35) (0.34) (0.33)  (0.28)
Distance to nearest concrete road  0.03 0.06 0.07  0.14*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.08)
Number of schools  -0.36 -0.77* -0.48  -0.43
(0.43) (0.42) (0.46)  (0.42)
Number of public toilets  -0.56 -1.09 -0.11  -0.14
(0.97) (1.00) (0.74)  (0.58)
Number of bus and minibus trips  -3.63 -2.49 -0.48  -1.68
(2.92) (2.92) (2.94)  (2.56)
Household pipeline or toilet connection  -0.09 -0.07 -0.37  -0.23
(0.37) (0.35) (0.32)  (0.32)
STREETLIGHTS - Composite measure  -0.26 -0.08 -0.31*  -0.13
(0.20) (0.20) (0.18)  (0.17)
# of Observations in common support 102 103 127  136
Notes: Bootstrapped Standard Errors given in parentheses, using 1000 replications. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
Conditioning variables in Model (1): female population ratio, SC population ratio, total population under six years of age, total 
population, total village cultivated land area. Conditioning variables in Model (2): SC population ratio, total population under six 
years of age, total population, total village cultivated land area. Conditioning variables in Model (3): total female population, total 
SC population, total population under six years of age, total population, total village cultivated land area. 
Conditioning variables in Model (4): total SC population, total population under six years of age, total population, total village 
cultivated land area 
                                                                                                                                                                           
estimation given in Table 29 and the graphs in Figures 9-12.  
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Figure A.7. DID PSM, common support for Model 1 
Model 1 uses the following conditioning variables: female population ratio, SC population ratio, total 
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Figure A.8. DID PSM, common support for Model 2 
Model 2 uses the following conditioning variables: SC population ratio, total population under six years 
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Figure A.9. DID PSM, common support for Model 3 
Model 3 uses the following conditioning variables: total female population, total SC population, total 
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Figure A.10. DID PSM, common support for Model 4 
Model 4 uses the following conditioning variables: total SC population, total population under six years 
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